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Royer, Collard, Cousin and Jouffroy. But, in reading Boutroux, one would have to believe that in the XIX century, very few, except the Scotch and Eclectic philosophers have had any influence. Boutroux preserves a most astonishing silence as to German, and especially Kantian, influence. It may be said that this does not pertain to his subject. Be it. But Boutroux has attributed so much in French philosophy to Scotch influence, that if he were now to write an essay upon German influence on French philosophy, he would find that he has left none to assign to the philosophers of that country. Not only does Boutroux completely ignore Kant, but he goes so far as to make Hamilton a pupil of Reid; and, what is worse than all else, he claims that Renouvier, the head of the New *Kantian* School in France, is a follower in philosophy of Hamilton.

Another striking example of the method of our author is this: According to Boutroux, A. Comte is a production of the Scotch School, *because* he considered Hume his most important precursor. How could a man like Boutroux apparently forget that the part of Hume's philosophy adopted by Comte, was exactly that part of his doctrine against which the School of Reid fought with might and main?

Finally, a few words on the essay on Socrates. It is the best thing ever written on this philosopher that I know of. The author discusses the opinions of prominent thinkers on Socrates, especially Schleiermacher, Zeller, Grote, Fonillée.

The most important theses attributed to Socrates by Boutroux are as follows: The object of his thinking is True Happiness in opposition to apparent bliss. He finds this happiness in virtue. The art of doing right has to combine itself with, or rather is based upon, the science of doing right. To attain this end, all science must be concentrated in ethics. Physics and metaphysics are treated by him only for the sake of ethics. Socrates's great merit consists in having established a science of ethics.

The basis of science—which our author considers synonymous with ethics—is the “General.” This word, we are to understand, means: What everybody thinks, what is the common fund of thinking of all men. There must exist something of this kind, since men can understand one another by means of language. In order to find out what this “General” is, one must speak with ordinary men, which, as we know, Socrates did. His method of teaching was the dialogue.

The result of his researches in the domain of science of ethics, is: Self-control is the greatest virtue. Socrates is not the good-natured man we often believe him to be; his actions seem to spring from a source of goodness, but his end was only his own perfection, not the relief of the suffering of others. His main object is to discipline himself.

See especially pages 83-84, too long to quote here.

ALBERT SCHINZ.

Scipio Sighele. Psychologie des Sectes. Traduction de L. BRANDIN. Paris, Girard & Brière, 1898. Bibliothèque de Sociologie Internationale.

Introduction. With the progress of civilization, crime has changed its character. With savage peoples it was gross and brutal; it has now grown more and more crafty and refined, it has become intellectual. This is not only the case with individual crime, but also with collective crime. The author claims the honor of having introduced the study of two kinds of crime in regard to collective bodies, such as crowds, sects, classes, etc.

Chapter I. There are different kinds of crowds, ranging from the heterogeneous crowd to the organized State, which is the supreme and most perfect form of homogeneous crowds, reached by the intermediate stages of theater or concert goers, clubs, jurors, parliaments, sects, castes and classes. The prominent feature of the *sect* is that they have some faith, religious or politic, in common, that of the *caste* is a common profession, and that of the *class* common interests.¹

Chapter II. The individual is always influenced by the circle which surrounds him. The member of a sect is influenced by an idea in which he believes. The sect becomes a party when the idea has gained a sufficient number of partisans. The difference between a sect and a simple crowd is, that a crowd uses only violence to attain its ends, while a sect employs craft. A sect always has a leader (*meneur*), which leader, however, is led (*mené*) in his turn by the idea he fights for.

Chapter III. There are different kinds of morality, individual and social, the morality of family, of country, etc. Among others also the morality of sects and politics. All of them are either morality of love or of hatred, and have their origin in the instinct of preservation.

Chapter IV. Man as an individual is far more moral than man as a social being. The long discussion upon the legitimacy of a morality of hatred, which the social man holds, remains without result. On page 174 the author says: "Everybody admits that ideal politics would mean honest politics. But could such politics be ingenious (*génial*) at the same time, and thus useful and fertile? Can you imagine a diplomacy which would be great without lies? A government which would be strong but void of despotism? A sect succeeding without violence of some kind? Neither in the past nor in the present do we find such examples. As for the future it seems doubtful."

One sees to what solution the author inclines; however he appears to be afraid to confess it here. But the "Introduction" clearly signifies a negative solution, since there he positively asserts that civilization is based upon two kinds of crime, one using cunning, and the other employing violence.

In the Appendix: "*Against Parliamentarism*," Sighele points out that, even if the members of a parliament are the best men of a country, the result of such a government would be most unsatisfactory. This he bases upon the (rather doubtful) argument of Max Nordau, in the second chapter of his "Paradoxes:" "One may say that all men in a normal condition possess certain qualities which constitute a common value, identic, equal, we will say to x . Superior individuals possess an additional value; but this time it is of a different kind with each one; it must consequently be indicated in a different way in each case; we will say, for instance, that it is equal to b, c, d , etc. It follows, that, out of an assembly of twenty men, all of whom are geniuses of the highest order, there will be twenty x 's, but only one b , one c , one d , etc., and the twenty x 's will naturally outweigh the isolated b, c, d ; in other words, the "general" in human nature will outweigh the individual personality, and the cap of the working-man will eclipse the hat of the physician, of the thinker, and of the philosopher. "Parliamentarism is the system of making laws by a majority, which majority represents the common level of the intelligence of a nation. Now, if the majority is to be considered as being right, then all progress may be looked upon as an impossibility."

These are the ideas exposed and upheld in the book. They are

¹ This classification is taken from Le Bon.

neither original, nor numerous, nor very deep. I do not see well why R. Worms has considered this work worthy of being translated and introduced into the "Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale." 1. As for the lack of originality, it is necessary only to read Chapter III, where the old and well-known differences of views in the ethical judgment of a single man is as broadly exposed as if nobody had ever pointed it out before, or as if it were necessary to explain at length to a philosopher, that the deed of Charlotte Corday cannot be judged in the same way as an ordinary crime. 2. The scarcity of ideas becomes apparent by this summary. 3. I said that the book is not deep. As an example of this, the fact may serve, that Sighele thinks it necessary to demonstrate that the leader of a homogeneous association only exerts his influence upon members of his association, while the leader of a heterogeneous association, or a crowd, exerts his influence upon a less defined class of people (pp. 79-80). It must be added, that the author repeats himself so often, that it is tiresome to read him. An idea which would be amply treated in a single sentence is met with again and again. (See, for instance, p. 46 the difference between a *sect* and a *crowd*.)

Mr. Sighele, as Mr. Le Bon in France, has made a specialty of the study of the psychology of crowds. In a very high tone he claims for himself priority over Le Bon, and considers it wise to take up his polemic again in this book (p. 42). But putting aside the question of priority, I am sure that many will agree with me, that the "Psychologie des Foules," by Le Bon, is of far greater value than Sighele's works; Le Bon is truly a scientist, while Sighele is only an enthusiastic writer who dwells upon some few ideas with great volubility.

ALBERT SCHINZ.

Psychologie du Peuple Français, par ALFRED FOUILLEE. (Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine. F. Alcan, Paris, 1898. pp. 388.)

Mr. Fouillée has added a new volume to his collection of books developing his favorite thesis of "*Idees-Forces*." His theory is plainly seen throughout the volume. Nationality should not be considered from a purely physiological, ethnological, or economical standpoint; above all it manifests itself in psychological characteristics: language, religion, poetry and art. Of late years too much importance has been attributed to physical causes, and the reaction of the intelligence and the will against the milieu has been too much neglected: "Men, and especially groups of the human society, adapt the milieu to themselves with as much facility as they adapt themselves to the milieu." (P. 56.) Owing to the intelligence of man, history of humanity cannot be reduced to natural history: "The milieu modifies the animal, but man modifies the milieu." (P. 56.) Book I is devoted to determining what races have united to form the French nation.

In Book II the character of the Gauls is described, and in Book III that of the present French nation. The resemblance between the two is striking. There is hardly a single feature of the Gauls, such as ancient writers mention, which is not again found in the modern inhabitants of France,—and one doubts, after all, whether the influence of the milieu, already noticed by Strabo, is not of greater importance than the authors seem to admit.

Book IV is entitled "Degeneration or Crisis?" Mr. Fouillée admits that France has come to a crisis; but contrary to many ethnologists of to-day, he does not admit any degeneration. There is no doubt that the nation is greatly attacked, but it is, as yet, not so weak as to